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Abstract  This paper describes and assesses the arguments offered both 
against closed borders and in favor of a more open borders approach to U.S. 
immigration reform as those arguments are set forth in R. Pevnick’s book, 
Immigration and the Constraints of Justice. We find numerous problems 
with Pevnick’s reasoning on both counts.
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R. Pevnick (2011) introduces his “associative ownership view” which 
seeks to provide a better framework for thinking about immigration 
issues than other theories. (Pevnick 2011: 6) Metaethically, Pevnick 
“doubt[s] whether the demands of ethics can be properly seen as pre-
scribing a uniquely acceptable line of action for individual agents… [he 
doubts] whether most interesting policy questions admit of only one 
acceptably just solution.” (Pevnick 2011: 7) In line with this, he focuses 
“on describing the constraints imposed by justice and, thus, on the ac-
ceptable range of possibilities.” (Pevnick 2011: 7) In addition, he takes 
himself “to be offering theoretical support for intuitive convictions that 
many of us will have regarding immigration that are not well explained, 
or accounted for, by existing theories.” (Pevnick 2011: 17)
Pevnick goes on to describe three dominant views in recent immigra-
tion discourse: statism, open borders, and shared identity. His taxono-
my describes these views as follows. Statism “holds that considerations 
of justice are inapplicable beyond state borders and, accordingly, that 
citizens should select that immigration policy which is best for current 
citizens. …little or no weight ought to be given to the interests of for-
eigners.” (Pevnick 2011: 8) Pevnick uses J. Carens’ position to serve as the 
paradigmatic open borders position: “Borders should generally be open 
and … people should normally be free to leave their country of origin 
and settle in another, subject only to the sorts of constraints that bind HOW NOT TO ARgUE AbOUT ImmIgRATION J. Angelo Corlett, Kimberly Unger
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current citizens in their own country. (Carens 1987, 252).” (Pevnick 2011: 
12) The shared identity position is described by Pevnick as significantly 
less homogenous than statism and open borders views. But the shared 
identity approach to immigration assumes both that “justice requires 
public redistributive institutions along the lines of the modern welfare 
state” and that the “efficacy of such redistributive institutions depends 
on citizens sharing a common public culture or national identity.” (Pe-
vnick 2011: 14) It is a position based on social trust amongst citizens in 
the state. While he sees some similarity between the shared identity 
view and his own associative ownership position, Pevnick ultimately re-
jects all three of these views, but incorporates some of their strengths 
into his own. For example, his standpoint is like statism in that he wants 
to justify some sovereignty, but differs in what his view takes to be the 
source and range of that sovereignty. Pevnick states:
In short, the associative ownership view insists that the citizenry 
constitutes an association extending through time that comes to 
have a claim over state institutions as a result of the efforts—from 
physical  labor and tax payments to obeying the  law—that  make 
such institutions possible. In this sense, the citizenry has a speci-
al ownership relationship with state institutions that distinguishes 
their position from that of foreigners. It is, I argue, this relationship 
that underlies or legitimizes claims of sovereignty. (Pevnick 2011: 11)
Moreover, there are limits to sovereignty for “the needs and interests of 
foreigners are neither beyond the scope of justice nor trumped by con-
siderations of sovereignty.” (Pevnick 2011: 21) This is because Pevnick as-
sumes that all individuals are, to some degree, moral equals. (Pevnick 
2011: 23, 27) Thus a state should not have as its only goal its survival, as 
statism purports. (Pevnick 2011: 26)
Pevnick parallels a state’s “prima facie claim to make future decisions 
regarding the shape of [its] programs” with the claims of ownership de-
rived from labor. (Pevnick 2011: 33) But can the claims of ownership de-
rived from labor be extended to states, particularly if membership in 
them is non-voluntary? In order to resurrect our intuitions on this mat-
ter, he gives us two hypothetical examples: the examples of the Kid-
napped Lecturers and the Family Farm. In the former, political theorists 
are kidnapped and forced to create lectures of which are later sold. The 
example suggests ownership can be derived from non-voluntary asso-
ciation because, Pevnick writes, “Although the political theorists were 
forced into this joint work, one cannot reasonably doubt the claim that 
their labor gives them a right to the profits that result from the sale KRITIČKI OSVRT
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of the lectures as well as future rights to, and control over, the materi-
al therein.” (Pevnick 2011: 37) Unlike the example, however, ownership 
claims over states cannot expire given the citizens are constantly “en-
gaging in the project in ways that renew claims of ownership.” (Pevnick 
2011: 37) To describe this type of engagement Pevnick writes, “The citi-
zenry raises resources through taxation and invests those resources in 
valuable public goods: basic infrastructure, defense, the establishment 
and maintenance of an effective market, a system of education, and the 
like.” (Pevnick 2011: 38) He uses the example of a farm which is passed 
down to the owner’s children (albeit with a delayed status of full privi-
leges, given the heir’s age) to further suggest that the non-voluntary 
character of membership passed down through generations can with-
stand objections to ownership claims. (Pevnick 2011: 37-38)
Pevnick considers the objection that “states’ rights to self-determina-
tion cannot rest on claims of ownership because the history of states is 
clouded by injustice in a way that casts doubt on any claims of owner-
ship that they advance.” (Pevnick 2011: 41) Bracketing the “dispute” (Pe-
vnick 2011: 41) concerning reparations of historic injustices that would 
challenge claims to state legitimacy and sovereignty, Pevnick provides 
this response:
[W]hatever the correct view about how to specify the particular de-
mands of rectification, it should be consistent with the associative 
ownership approach, for all I have wanted to say is that the associa-
te ownership position suggests that it is possible for a group to have 
legitimate claims of collective ownership over the institutions they 
construct. (Pevnick 2011: 41)
And Pevnick even concurs that reparative justice is owed in certain cases 
of historic injustice. (Pevnick 2011: 41) Yet in agreeing with this point, he 
fails to understand that unrectified injustices of genocidal and slavery 
proportions (against American Indians, for example) cannot generate 
a state’s moral right to legitimacy or sovereignty. Pevnick ends his con-
cise discussion of this matter abruptly and moves forward to consider a 
“more sweeping claim.” (Pevnick 2011: 41) In cases where the injustices 
of the past make it such that there can be no legitimate claims of own-
ership, Pevnick thinks that accepting this would force us to give up all 
claims of ownership (such as “congregations, family farms, or states”) for 
“[o]ur history is too unavoidably inundated with injustice for any claim 
to be purely innocent.” (Pevnick 2011: 42) Yet giving up “all claims of 
ownership is surely a medicine worse than the symptom.” (Pevnick 2011: 
42) Pevnick seems to suggest that instead we should note the   legitimacy HOW NOT TO ARgUE AbOUT ImmIgRATION J. Angelo Corlett, Kimberly Unger
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of ownership claims based on degrees. (Pevnick 2011: 42, 58-59) That is, 
it is more legitimate to claim ownership of a car that was bought from 
“the founder of the car company [who had] resources that were pro-
cured as a result of involvement with colonialism,” than it is to claim 
ownership of a car you stole. (Pevnick 2011: 42) Pevnick denies “that his-
torical injustice somehow delegitimizes (a) all claims to ownership in 
our world; or (b) all such claims advanced by states.” (Pevnick 2011: 42)
But denying a claim is hardly equivalent to arguing against it. Pevnick 
owes us an argument in favor of his claims instead of his dismissiveness 
of what he takes to be problematic. But matters take a turn for even the 
worse for Pevnick as he resorts to the disingenuousness of misattrib-
uting a straw man argument to those who would disagree with him on 
such vital matters: “Rather than insisting on the impossible demand 
that claims have immaculate histories, we can only reasonably judge 
claims on a continuum: to what extent, we ought to ask, do the particu-
lar injustices underlying this claim undermine its legitimacy?” (Pevnick 
2011: 42) The logical problems with this claim are manifold. But we shall 
note two. First, Pevnick’s use of the locution “reasonably” in this context 
is a subtle way to suggest that those who are reasonable will adopt his 
position on the matter. In this way, Pevnick resorts to a kind of ad homi-
nem abusive strategy to win the point, suggesting in effect that if one is 
reasonable one will adopt his attitude toward the matter. We write “atti-
tude” here in that there is no supporting argument for Pevnick’s claim. 
Second, and more important, is his suggestion that there are those who 
would “insist on the impossible demand that claims have immaculate 
histories” as a prerequisite for the moral legitimacy or sovereignty of 
a state. But there is no one in the scholarly literature on such subjects 
who takes such a position (Pevnick curiously cites no one), as it is a 
straw man at best. Those philosophers discussing matters of the recti-
fication of historic injustices make no such demands. (Boxill 1972; Cor-
lett 2003, Chapters 8-9; 2010; McGary 1999) They too see injustice and 
justice and responsibility for it on a continuum. (Corlett 2006, Chapters 
7, 9) Indeed, some have made that very point long before Pevnick did.
Interestingly, Pevnick states, “[G]oods [like the ones described above] 
only exist through the coordinated decisions, labor, and contribu-
tions of members. Given this, members may come, through their ef-
forts, to have an entitlement to the accomplishments and misdeeds of 
the community.” (Pevnick 2011: 53, emphasis provided) However, some 
argue that, just like governments and businesses can pass on debt to KRITIČKI OSVRT
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their heirs, oppressors can pass on responsibility for their injustices to 
their heirs as well (although the heirs do not inherit the guilt or fault in-
volved in their ancestors’ injustices). (Corlett 2003, Chapters 8-9; 2010) 
If we can inherit responsibility nonetheless, then this serves as a rea-
sonable reply to the challenge to state legitimacy and sovereignty that 
poses moral problems for Pevnick’s position on associative ownership 
of states and their alleged rights to make immigration decisions based 
on such rights. This is crucial in that Pevnick also states that “we need 
a theory of rectification to explain what it means to have a legitimate 
claim, and I make no effort to present such a theory here.” (Pevnick 2011: 
42-43) But then how is it supposed to follow that, as he continues, “con-
cerns regarding such injustices do not cast doubt on the position as a 
whole”? (Pevnick 2011: 43) Is Pevnick implying that historic acts of state 
genocide and massive land theft serve in certain instances as possible 
grounds for new rights that emerge for the victors of such injustices? In 
fact, this is precisely what Pevnick states in his agreement with J. Wal-
dron’s since refuted (Corlett 2003: 178-184) line of reasoning for such a 
claim. (Pevnick 2011: 43) Although Pevnick does admit that rectifica-
tion for past injustices is important, to agree with D. Schmidtz in stat-
ing “Our task, then, ‘is to live constructively in a world that we acknowl-
edge is profoundly marred’” is perhaps not taking sufficiently seriously 
responsibility for past injustices. (Pevnick 2011: 42)
Pevnick refines his associative ownership approach to immigration in 
the following way. First, he takes on the objection of whether his ap-
proach can justify excluding non-members from a state’s territory, in 
addition to a state’s institutions. (Pevnick 2011: 54) For “Citizens have a 
right to the goods they have produced, but not to the territory that long 
predates such goods. So, in providing such goods, the state may either 
figure out a way to provide such goods in an excludable fashion or accept 
that others present in the territory may free-ride on their contributions.” 
(Pevnick 2011: 56) Pevnick responds to this by stating that “territorial 
control is a necessary precondition on continuing to provide such ben-
efits (because it is needed in order to make possible their continued ef-
forts at providing security, public health, protection from fraud, discour-
aging free-riders, and the like).” (Pevnick 2011: 57) The objector might 
press further, however, by claiming that the state’s territory contains nat-
ural resources of which “ought to be shared across humanity instead of 
being hoarded by the citizens lucky enough to find themselves on such 
territory.” (Pevnick 2011: 59) Pevnick grants that states ought then toHOW NOT TO ARgUE AbOUT ImmIgRATION J. Angelo Corlett, Kimberly Unger
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make a good faith effort to admit those who seek territorial access 
just for the sake of territorial access, but this obligation ought not to 
be construed in a way that forces it to admit all those who seek acce-
ss to the citizenry’s package of public goods… Second, there are ways 
to share the value of differential access to natural resources without 
also giving territorial access to all who would claim it in order to cap-
ture a stake in the publicly provided goods of the political commu-
nity. For example, Thomas Pogge advocates a tax on the consumpti-
on of natural resources… (Pevnick 2011: 60)
A clearer idea of Pevnick’s view emerges in his criticism of the open bor-
ders advocates’ claims that there is a moral right to freedom of move-
ment. He writes, “[W]e already recognize as legitimate all kinds of limits 
on movement: you are not free to move onto property owned by oth-
ers, to climb onto the lap of the Lincoln Memorial, or even to move too 
quickly on an interstate. These restrictions seem quite unlike the one 
confining us to a single room.” (Pevnick 2011: 84) Because there seems to 
be a difference in these kinds of restrictions, Pevnick argues that there 
is a difference “between the need for a set of options sufficient for the 
creation of an autonomous life and an optimal set of options.” (Pevnick 
2011: 84) In employing some immigration restrictions but nevertheless 
admitting immigrants like asylum-seekers, we are preserving the need 
for a set of options sufficient for the creation of an autonomous life for 
both citizens and those who need the legal right to freedom of move-
ment in order to protect their moral subsistence rights from the coun-
tries they are trying to emigrate from. (Pevnick 2011: 87, 101) Some might 
argue that states, rather than accept certain immigrants, should pursue 
development projects within the countries threatening their citizens’ 
moral subsistence rights and thus that there should be no legal right to 
free movement for such immigrants. (Pevnick 2011: 90) Pevnick thinks 
that until such development projects make an impact some immigrants 
should have a legal right to free movement but that such development 
projects might not even be able to transform conditions in such a posi-
tive way. (Pevnick 2011: 90) Therefore, the legal right to free movement 
should still obtain given that the immigrants in question are truly op-
pressed. Related to this is the often held belief in the moral right to exit a 
state. To be consistent with his other beliefs, Pevnick surprisingly (given 
the often held belief in the right to exit) states, “[T]here is a strong case 
to be made for thinking that by pouring their resources into the training 
of [its citizens], the political community obtains a kind of partial claim 
to the skills of that individual and thus may restrict their exit for limited 
periods of time.” (Pevnick 2011: 99) Perhaps in part to   mitigate any out-KRITIČKI OSVRT
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rage at such a conclusion Pevnick also writes, “Of course, that accepting 
public training will bring along with it temporary limitations on move-
ment ought to be made clear prior to acceptance of that training.” (Pe-
vnick 2011: 99) In conclusion, “neither rights of emigration nor rights of 
immigration are basic moral rights, but are instead of instrumental val-
ue because of their ability to (sometimes) protect interests that do rise 
to the level of moral rights.” (Pevnick 2011: 99) And, as suggested above, 
“it seems clear that [countries accepting immigrants based on their le-
gal right to free movement] ought to be willing to accept some sacrifice” 
but not to such a degree that they “leave the world of moral require-
ments and embark upon the supererogatory,” like the heroes of Nazi 
Germany who secretly helped Jews. (Pevnick 2011: 102)
Furthermore, Pevnick believes that “as long as we live in a world marred 
by severe poverty and are without the capacity to quickly and effective-
ly eradicate that poverty via development policies alone, limiting im-
migration for the sake of local environmental concerns elevates issues 
such as urban sprawl and the maintenance of sufficient wildlife above 
the basic interests of potential migrants,” and this is, Pevnick suggests, 
perhaps a “perverse” ordering. (Pevnick 2011: 153) First, “[w]hat mat-
ters is not the country’s total emission, but global emissions” so paying 
attention to how a country’s total emissions have been affected by im-
migration is a mistake. (Pevnick 2011: 152) This is especially so if immi-
grants are compelled to adopt more environmentally-friendly lifestyles 
in the country to which they emigrated. Secondly, though the preserva-
tion of wilderness areas and biodiversity is very important, we have to 
question whether prioritizing it “over the provision of basic necessities 
for potential immigrants” through restricted borders is justifiable. (Pe-
vnick 2011: 152-153)
Pevnick notes that “birthrates among native citizens in the United 
States (and generally throughout receiving countries) are quite low, 
population growth in these countries is now mainly driven by immi-
gration—both by their arriving in the country and their subsequent-
ly having more children.” (Pevnick 2011: 151) Because of this, we would 
have expected Pevnick to address whether admitting more immigrants 
(those who have the legal right to do so) puts more stress on the envi-
ronment than had the immigrants not been permitted to emigrate and, 
presumably unlike before, produce children in the state to which they 
have migrated. Pevnick writes, “I am tempted to think that the environ-
mental problems we face reflect more basic challenges to the way we HOW NOT TO ARgUE AbOUT ImmIgRATION J. Angelo Corlett, Kimberly Unger
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  organize our lifestyles, challenges that ought not to be confused with, 
or pinned on, the largely separate issue of immigration.” (Pevnick 2011: 
153) Yet insofar as immigration affects population size, and population 
size affects the environment, surely immigration and the environment 
are two issues more closely related than Pevnick believes.
Pevnick denies “that concerns regarding population density provide 
reason to limit population” and that “the density of a community’s pop-
ulation affects the kind of life members can live and so seems to be a 
relevant consideration in thinking about justice and immigration.” (Pe-
vnick 2011: 150) According to Pevnick, because the United States, in par-
ticular, “far from faces a land shortage” there is no good instrumentalist 
reason to close its borders. (Pevnick 2011: 150) In this way, “the interest 
of citizens of destination countries have in a reasonably stable social 
context does not necessarily override the interests or claims of potential 
immigrants.” (Pevnick 2011: 149) For Pevnick, the claim of current citi-
zens in a country that there is no additional room for more immigrants 
is no justification for closing its borders. “Rather, the claim must be that 
current citizens prefer the lifestyle afforded by living in a country with 
a relatively low density of population.” (Pevnick 2011: 151) And this can 
be cashed out in terms of environmental concerns. (Pevnick 2011: 151)
Pevnick’s handling of these matters is to measure environmental con-
cerns globally, instead of locally (Pevnick 2011: 152), and then to suggest 
that the humanitarianism of honoring the interests of potential immi-
grants outweighs concerns for the environment. (Pevnick 2011: 152-153) 
But he admits that his own opinion, undefended as it is, “hinges on 
claims regarding anthropocentrism.” (Pevnick 2011: 153) Further admit-
ting that “These are enormously difficult and contested philosophical 
issues,” he nonetheless avers that environmental concerns are “largely 
separate” from the issue of immigration. (Pevnick 2011: 153)
Yet Pevnick’s dismissiveness regarding such matters effectively deni-
grates the religions and ways of being of indigenous populations, each 
of which construes humans as being part of the environment, part of 
nature, implying that all of nature has importance and that one aspect 
of it (such as humans) enjoys no privileged position. Pevnick’s appar-
ently Christianized notion of a human-centered world is quite indica-
tive of the very oppressive ideologies that colonized the Americas in 
the first place! For Pevnick, immigration has nothing to do with gen-
uinely native populations, as such issues are brushed aside as being KRITIČKI OSVRT
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  intractable philosophical issues. But since they are so foundational to 
immigration discourse, conceptually speaking, no amount of utilitarian 
disregard for indigenous rights will suffice for sound reasoning. Nor will 
Pevnick’s mere propounding of a speciesist and essentially Christian 
ideology which holds that humans count more than the environment 
and is meant to serve as a sound argument for his associative ownership 
way of thinking about immigration. For the right to control borders, 
normatively speaking, is contingent on the moral right of a legitimate 
state to assert its sovereignty in that way. But if a state is not morally le-
gitimate, then it lacks the very legitimacy that ground its sovereignty 
to control its borders. One way, perhaps the only practical avenue, to 
attempt to gain a meaningful degree of such moral legitimacy is for a 
country founded on genocide and slavery and massive land theft to rec-
tify its wrongs in various and meaningful ways and for some time. (Cor-
lett 2010) For as justice and injustice are matters of degree, so are mat-
ters of state legitimacy. And as a state decides to take it upon itself to 
rectify its most horrendous evils, so too it can then begin to acquire a 
modicum of moral legitimacy. In turn, it can gain a moral right to sov-
ereignty over its own affairs, one that can in some regard serve as a basis 
of its right to determine its own borders. But one would think, unlike 
Pevnick, that one such road to state legitimacy would entail the taking 
seriously of indigenous rights and interests at the very heart of one’s 
theory of immigration.
So other factors, such as the injustices committed against American In-
dians of who seem to be the original moral claim right-holders of the 
territory on which the U.S. resides, and whose land and natural resourc-
es were stolen from the Indians by the U.S. and some other colonial 
powers, have nothing to do with what grounds the moral legitimacy of 
a state? It is especially surprising that Pevnick does not address this giv-
en that, according to him, an instance of one country stealing natural 
resources from a group of persons who were entitled to them is an in-
stance of an unjust inequality his view is supposed to take into consid-
eration. (Pevnick 2011: 118) It is doubly surprising because his associa-
tive ownership theory of immigration is supposed to be dedicated to the 
articulation of justifiable immigration policy within the United States. 
(Pevnick 2011: 18, 163) Why, then, does Pevnick not address the rights of 
and injustices to American Indians in addressing justifiable immigra-
tion policy? It is at least in part because he fails to take indigenous rights 
and interests seriously, as he has completely written them out of the HOW NOT TO ARgUE AbOUT ImmIgRATION J. Angelo Corlett, Kimberly Unger
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complex equation of justice. For Pevnick’s view is a simple-minded con-
cern for what counts for those in power and those seeking to join that 
elite group. It is hardly a concern for the least well-off, and ironically for 
those on whose land the generations of us nonindigenous folk remain.
In the end, Pevnick’s reasoning fails to recognize in his own view what 
he criticizes various other scholars in doing. First, he notes that other 
scholars on immigration policy fail to “explicitly recognize that their 
policy proposals grow from normative commitments.” (Pevnick 2011: 
5) But Pevnick certainly fails to take indigenous rights seriously, as he 
propounds a theory of immigration that implicitly trumps indigenous 
rights to territory -- including indigenous moral rights to the territory 
of what is now called the “United States!” -- by a host of social utility 
considerations. Yet John Rawls, some of whose words are cited often by 
Pevnick, is famous for his philosophical destruction of utilitarianism 
because it disrespects rights which in turn undergird the separateness 
of persons which utilitarianisms fail to regard. (Rawls 1999: 3-5) Hence 
Pevnick falls right into the trap of being “stuck talking past one another 
because” he too is “committed to disparate normative criteria.” (Pevnick 
2011: 5) Pevnick also gives the impression that he is serious about “ex-
amining to what extent and in what type of circumstances frameworks 
for thinking about immigration are consistent with considered moral 
convictions.” (Pevnick 2011: 6) Yet he is hardly serious about indigenous 
rights. This point embarrasses Pevnick’s putative commitment to the-
oretical fairness when he writes: “It is important to deny the putative 
naturalness of positions and instead assess the assumptions on which 
they rely. Justifying an immigration policy depends on making explic-
it and defending the normative assumptions underlying the position.” 
(Pevnick 2011: 6) His denial of indigenous rights precisely is natural to 
most theorists in the U.S., and yet Pevnick does nothing to question it. 
As we saw, he instead resorts to “remarks” that merely parrot the status 
quo in U. S. political theory, without even the slightest recognition that 
he ought to in a fair-minded manner take indigenous rights seriously.
An example of Pevnick’s simplistic theoretical vision is found in his state-
ment that “opinions on how to treat illegal immigrants or whether to 
militarize the border depend on underlying views about the nature of 
state sovereignty and the legitimacy of state control over territory. Thus 
skipping over these deeper philosophical conflicts in order to get directly 
to policy issues promises to leave us begging the question against those 
with whom we disagree.” (Pevnick 2011: 7) It is unfortunate that Pevnick KRITIČKI OSVRT
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fails to heed his own advice here. His wisdom that “it is imperative to 
assess the various paradigms people use to conceptualize controversies 
surrounding immigration” proves hypocritical as he ignores the rights of 
the most long-standing group of non-immigrants, the only ones on the 
continent who are not immigrants, in his discussion. Indeed, Pevnick’s 
discussion is indicative of every other US scholarly discussion of which 
we are aware in the sense that it represents one or another of the lead-
ing opinions of those in power who simply ignore the rights of those who 
possess the greatest moral claims to the territory in question. Pevnick’s 
reasoning is consonant with the New Utilitarians whose teleological 
commitment to equality (Pevnick 2011: 13) is so great that it actually com-
mits another error against which Pevnick himself cautions, namely, “to 
misunderstand the grounds and responsibilities of that sovereignty” that 
a state is said to have (Pevnick 2011: 12) as it ignores the historical contri-
butions to institutions made by political communities. (Pevnick 2011: 13) 
Recall that it is Pevnick who states that “positions that hinge on ignor-
ing the historical process by which state institutions came about and the 
connection between such institutions and political community that con-
structed them (such as open borders views) are necessarily incomplete.” 
(Pevnick 2011: 39) But while Pevnick makes a “remark” or two about such 
issues, his remarks fall far short of constituting solid argumentation and 
resemble rather one who refuses to plumb the philosophical and moral 
depths of some of the foundational issues of immigration insofar as they 
rely on answers to questions of state legitimacy and sovereignty.
Pevnick, like so many other New Utilitarians, cannot be committed to 
rights in his discussion of immigration. For as Rawls and many others 
have argued decades ago, “rights” are not rights to the extent that they 
can be trumped by social utility considerations. Perhaps Pevnick means 
to discuss immigration rights in terms of claims or interests. If so, they 
must not be valid ones as rights just are valid claims or interests. So our 
suggestion to Pevnick and the growing hoard of New Utilitarians who 
discuss immigration in terms of rights is to either stop using “rights” 
and its cognates, or to disavow their underlying utilitarianism that in 
effect robs rights of their genuine significance. For it is precisely utili-
tarianism’s consequentialist commitment to its principle of utility that 
stands as an ethical barrier to utilitarianism’s respect for rights. (Fein-
berg 1980; Mackie 1984; Rawls 1999: 3-5; Rachels 1999: 110f.)
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J. Anđelo Korlet 
Kimberli Anger
Kako ne treba raspravljati o imigraciji
Apstrakt
U radu će biti predstavljeni i razmotreni argumenti koje R.Pevnik, u svojoj 
novoj knjizi Imigracija i ograničenja pravde, nudi protiv pristupa koji po-
drazumeva zatvorene granice, a u prilog pristupu otvorenijih granica u re-
formi imigracione politike SAD-a. Ukazaćemo na brojne probleme u Pev-
nikovoj argumentaciji povodom obe tvrdnje.
Ključne reči  zaštita životne sredine, istorijska nepravda, prenaseljenost 
ljudi, imigracija, prava urođenika, etatizam, utilitarizam.